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Transboundary Extraction of Groundwater in the Presence of Hydraulic Fracturing
A vast literature in the economics of transboundary resource sharing already exists (examples include Munro, 1979; Lange, Mungatana, and Hassan 2007; Calvo and Rubio, 2012; Long, 2012) . However, this literature is void of explicit incorporation of endogenous risk in a dynamic game setting because of the technical difficulty. Many such analyses are done with the simplifying assumption that control is linear in state variables or by imposing other similar constraints on control or state space. Nonlinear strategies that approach optimal cooperative solutions have been suggested (Tsutsui and Mino, 1990) . The sub-optimality of linear methods is well documented (Shimomura and Xie, 2008) . Other issues such as time inconsistency (Calvo, 1978) and nonuniqueness of solutions (Tsutsui and Mino, 1990) are also well known. This often leads to an analysis of transboundary resource sharing using the Cournot Nash setting, in a steady state situation. Unfortunately, this approach can be of little assistance when the number of state variables increases. Since risk is generally modeled as a state variable in an optimal control method, particularly because control variables affect its evolution, including risk is similar to having an additional state variable. All of these issues have contributed to difficulty in solving a transboundary resource problem in the presence of risk. Recent papers have addressed this issue, but only in the context where risk is not a state variable (Antoniadou et al., 2013) . We expand this literature by focusing on groundwater extraction under the transboundary situation when there is a risk of water quality deterioration.
Natural gas production through hydraulic fracturing or fracking (specifically horizontal slickwater fracking) 1 has brought or is likely to bring economic development into many parts of the U.S. Economic modeling of saltwater intrusion in aquifers owned by one entity has been done (for example, Tsur and Zamel, 1995) , but such analyses are rare in the framework of a transboundary resource allocation problem. In our opinion, this is mainly due to the intractability of these models, especially when the search is confined to analytical solutions. This paper incorporates transboundary and economic issues, relating to groundwater withdrawal under saltwater and chemical intrusion risk due to fracking, and takes small steps towards analytical solutions to such problems.
Our major result is that the presence of risk implies caution is needed in fracking. This is a consistent result in all of our models, and it is consistent with the so called "precautionary principle" (Polasky et al., 2011) . We also find that states "over-frack" when they don't cooperate. However, water extraction rates remain same for both cooperative and noncooperative 6 solutions. We also find that policy makers in principle can impose Pigouvian type tax on natural gas developers which would make the developers operate at the socially optimal level.
Model (I) Basic Model
There are two states which share a source of water: a groundwater aquifer. The states both have another useful resource, natural gas reserves, which they can mine. The benefit from mining the aquifer is given by 2 , 1 ),
, where the subscript i indicates the state, and similarly, the benefits from the natural gas mining, i.e. fracking, is given by 2 , 1 ),
. The fracking may, however, pose a risk to the water resources. Any such risk will take a form of chemical spill, methane release or salt water intrusion into the aquifer, after which the aquifer will be useless for both states. However, an intrusion into the aquifer won't affect the use of fracking itself, i.e. even after the chemical or salt water intrusion, the states may continue fracking. Let  indicate the time at which aquifer will be useless due to the intrusion. This is a random variable and will depend on the amount of fracking. In particular, let F(t) indicate the probability that t   . Fracking activities change the probability in the following way:
Before solving this problem, we conduct the following transformations of our risk representation. We first change (1) into a more manageable form as follows. Define the survival
. It is clear that (1) can be written in terms of S(t) as follows:
Before proceeding, we provide the following parametric specification for the benefit functions from water and fracking. Let U(w)= We look for the Markovian strategies of the players. The objective function is given as follows.
Given that the state variable is as in (1). This can be simplified and written in terms of S(t) as follows:
Assuming the value function of this problem to be V(S), where again we have removed player specific subscripts to indicate that we will be largely operating under the assumption that the players will be symmetric, and hence their value function will be the same, and exploiting the autonomous nature of the problem, we note that (2) can be written as follows:
Solving for optimal extraction of water and fracking, we get
. Assuming symmetry, the fracking and water extraction decisions of player 2 are also going to be the same. In particular,
This leads to the following simplification of (3):
This is a nonlinear differential equation of V(S), with no known analytical solution. Even for the parametric forms given above, numerical methods must be implemented to understand what happens further. We make two small modificationsto equation (4) to progress. The first is what we call a log approximation method. In this method, the variables are used in such a unit that they will be small enough to justify the relationship log(1+x)=x for some x. The second method is more exact, but requires us to constrain our benefit functions for fracking slightly by assuming that its benefit function is purely quadratic. In many case, this would not be a too outrageous an assumption.
To solve equation (4) using the log approximation method, we begin with the ansatz that V(S) is a function given by V(S)= B S A  log . Putting this in (4), and using the first order approximation for log S=S-1 with the appropriate assumption for S, we get an approximate solution as follows: The value of A is equal to the discounted net present value of the aquifer. While the presence of risk doesn't affect the optimal extraction of the aquifer directly, it decreases the optimal fracking by an amount which is the ratio of A to 2 4  . The decrease in fracking also, predictably, depends on the discount rate: the more the discount rate, the less the decrease in fracking. If the value of the aquifer is negligent compared to the value of the fracking, then the fracking will be the same as if there were no aquifer (or no threat to aquifer). Note that this solution is not very reliable for cases when r 0  . The method we talk next is more appropriate to understand what happens when r is close to 0.
The second method is a bit more involved, and is attributable to Tsutsui et al.(1990) . The maximization problem again leads to the relationship given in equation (3). Let . But when S=0, the problem is that of unconstrained problem , and , as equation (3) 
. Then, we can rewrite equation (6) .Understandably (6') is hard to solve analytically and has to be solved numerically.
For our further discussion, we just look at the equation (5), which is nonlinear in S , even though r is still assumed to be 0. From equation (5) . Initially, as S is large, this difference is also large as states would want to save the aquifer. However, as S becomes smaller and smaller, the difference also becomes smaller, and when S=0, the fracking converges to its value (i.e.  ) which is smaller than the value when no constraint regarding risk exists. This is understandable, since once states realize that survival function is too low, they would be less inhibited to extract the benefit from fracking.
In our opinion, these results conform to our a priori intuition. We now turn to situations where modifications are made to our basic model.
II. Model with limited aquifer capacity
Our first modification is the inclusion of aquifer as a stock variable, effectively indicating that it is a renewable resource, that has a finite stock at any given time. We indicate the evolution of aquifer stock level as follows:
We also explicitly include the technological innovations in fracking. In particular, we assume that the industry will dynamically improve the safety of its operations over time, and let it be denoted by  . The survival function thus evolves as follows:
Where S is bounded between 0 and 1. Notice that when 0   , we will have the evolution of the survival function as dealt in the simple model, so (8) is a more generalized setting.
We now solve the problem for an open loop Cournot Nash equilibrium in the steady state. We will continue to assume that the States are symmetric, in that they have identical utility function for water and fracking. State 1 will be maximizing the following problem:
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
Note that because we look for an open loop solution, both 2 f and 2 w are assumed to be fixed. The first order necessary conditions are (for interior solutions) , at the steady state, the following must hold: 
in an unconstrained problem. Expressed differently, if there exists some "supra-state" authority with the ability to tax the fracking wells, then it could impose a linear tax of S  per unit onto the fracking developers and let the states act as if there was no risk at all 2 . The steady state water extraction should not be a surprise as in the steady state, the costate variable associated with aquifer is also zero.
We now look at the optimal rate of water extraction during the transitional phase before the system reaches the steady state. The water extraction rate, as given by (9), is Hence when fracking is small and risk is low, the water extraction slowly increases before it converges to its steady state value.
III. Model with the cooperation among states
We now analyze the situation in which states cooperate. We look at the model of section II, where the aquifer stock is considered to be of limited quantity. Assume the states are symmetric and that
. This leads to the following problem:
The first order conditions for this problem will be:
When compared to the noncooperative problem, we note that the only difference is the speed at which marginal contribution of survival rate(  ) evolves. In particular, the steady state value of  is different in cooperative scenario ( f . This implies that under the cooperative outcome, the survival function ( f 2  ) is maintained at the higher level compared to the noncooperative outcome. By acting independently, the states are thus more likely to endanger the aquifers. Cooperation, on the other hand, is more likely to save the aquifer.In a noncooperative case, if r=  , we note that water extraction will be same as in a noncooperative case, i.e. will decrease over time before converging to the steady state value.
Conclusions
We provided the model of the impact of fracking on transboundary aquifers. Major findings are:
i. presence of risk implies caution in fracking activities in the steady state; ii. optimal fracking is higher in the noncooperative symmetric setting than in the cooperative outcome; and iii. a steady state survival function level will be higher under cooperation than the noncooperative situation.
The water extraction function will be the similar in both cases in the steady state situation. The water extraction steadily increases and converges to its steady state value.
Further efforts in the modeling of fracking should focus on providing explicit representation for amenity values, water contamination and the population dynamics of the area where fracking wells are located. Since fracking sites are also exhaustible resources, a more realistic model would have fracking sites as a state variable. Extraction and well set up in these sites will extend over time.
